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OPEN SOURCE SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS
Ethan R. Fitzpatrick*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the scientific community has made some
dramatic advances in the ability to chemically synthesize genome1
length strands of DNA. These advances have coincided with a
growing understanding of the functions of individual genes and gene
2
networks. With the available knowledge of how whole genomes
function, and the technical capability of synthesizing whole genomes,
it will be possible to digitally design novel organisms to perform some
desired function and then manifest that synthetic organism in the
3
real world. The J. Craig Venter Institute took the first steps toward
this goal by creating a synthetic organism controlled entirely by a
4
chemically synthesized genome. This advance provided:
a proof of principle for producing cells based on computerdesigned genome sequences. DNA sequencing of a cellular
genome allows storage of the genetic instructions for life as
a digital file . . . . [T]he approach [] developed [by the J.
Craig Venter Institute] should be applicable to the synthesis
and transplantation of more novel genomes as genome
5
design processes.
Although this ultimate goal of designing novel synthetic
organisms using synthetic biology sounds like pure science fiction, it
is entirely possible and would have an enormous impact on
* J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law, May 2013; Ph.D., University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2010; B.S., Rider University, 2002. Thanks to
Professor Jordan Paradise for her guidance, Becky Garibotto for her comments and
encouragement, and Desiree Grace for her thorough editing and assistance.
1
See Daniel G. Gibson et al., Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically
Synthesized Genome, 329 SCIENCE 52 (2010).
2
Matthias Heinemann & Sven Panke, Synthetic Biology—Putting Engineering Into
Biology, 22 BIOINFORMATICS 2790, 2790 (2006).
3
See Gibson et al., supra note 1, at 55.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 52.
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biotechnology and medicine. In the near future, synthetic organisms
might be designed to create new sources of food, fuel, and medicine
that current technology is not capable of producing. Additionally,
these benefits will arrive with incredible speed, efficiency, and cost
6
effectiveness. Designing wholly novel synthetic organisms is still on
the horizon, however, and presently scientists are left with a
combination of older methods to innovate in the field of
biotechnology. From this older technology, however, the technology
of synthetic biology has begun to emerge. In order to make the
possibilities of synthetic biology a reality in the least amount of time,
one organization—the BioBricks Foundation—is attempting to
protect this emerging field from the potentially stifling effects of
7
DNA patents by establishing an open-source movement. The hope is
that an open-source synthetic biology commons would encourage
innovation in ways similar to the wildly successful open-source
8
software movement.
Towards that end, a similar open-source
9
The world of
approach to synthetic biology might be useful.
synthetic biology, however, poses unique problems to the
establishment of an open-source community. These problems
include incentivizing entities to participate, maintaining openness
10
once it is established, and creating useable biomedical products.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the technology
of synthetic biology and explains why it is important. Part III
introduces the current movement towards open-source synthetic
biology, as established by the BioBricks Foundation. Part IV
describes the past strategies used to establish and maintain other
analogous open-source biotechnology movements. Within Part IV,
three specific strategies are discussed: a copyright approach, a
contract-based approach, and a patent-based approach to establish
and maintain a commons. Part V then assesses whether these
approaches to maintaining a synthetic biology commons are possible,
and, if so, what problems might be unique to synthetic biology. Next,
Part VI proposes a wholly novel strategy to advance the progress of
synthetic biology. This strategy uses an open-source/property-right
hybrid approach, under the auspices of a standard setting
6

See generally, Heinemann & Panke, supra note 2.
About the BioBricks Foundation, BIOBRICKS, http://biobricks.org
/about-foundation/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See, Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing Law For Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 629, 650–51 (2010).
7
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organization.
Part VII will conclude that a standard setting
organization for synthetic biology may help to overcome problems
that cannot be addressed under the three previously described
strategies.
II. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT?
A. Recombinant DNA Technology Laid the Foundation for Genetic
Engineering
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the molecule that encodes the
11
instructions for life. The DNA language uses four nucleotides—
adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine—organized in specific
12
sequences to compose the genes responsible for heritable traits.
The DNA sequence of an organism gets copied with an extremely
high fidelity, averaging only one nucleotide error for every billion
13
nucleotides copied. This DNA sequence is passed on to offspring,
14
transmitting genetic information from generation to generation.
Scientists have been tinkering with DNA since 1972, when Paul
Berg, Stanley Cohen, and Hubert Boyer discovered a way to cut and
15
paste pieces of DNA together. This was followed by many further
advances in manipulating sequences of DNA, such as the invention of
the “polymerase chain reaction” (used to amplify pieces of DNA),
16
rapid sequencing technology, and targeted gene replacement.
Before the development of these technologies, the sheer size and
chemical-repetitiveness of DNA made it one of the most difficult
17
molecules to study and manipulate.
The advent of the above
methods, however, has made DNA one of the easiest molecules to
18
manipulate.
Presently, DNA manipulation techniques have reached a level of
such sophistication that scientists routinely recombine the DNA
sequences within a species (or even between species), resulting in
19
novel DNA sequences that do not exist in nature. Scientists have
used this recombinant DNA technology (“rDNA technology”) in
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
Id. at 194.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 492.
Id.
ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 11, at 491.
Id.
Id. at 493.

OF

THE CELL 193 (4th ed. 2002).
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numerous applications, impacting various fields including medicine,
20
research, and agriculture. Despite these advances, however, rDNA
21
technology has limited scientists in some ways. Generally, rDNA
techniques involve manipulating a small number of genes with each
22
modification involving a time consuming procedure. Most scientific
advances using rDNA technology involves the engineering of a single
gene because of the time constraints and scientists’ superficial
23
understanding of how genes work alongside one another.
For
example, recombinant human insulin, which has almost entirely
24
replaced insulin derived from animal sources, is synthesized by
25
expressing a single human insulin gene in the bacteria E. Coli. In
the specific case of human insulin production, manipulation of a
single gene is sufficient to achieve the desired result: creating an
26
alternative source of insulin for people with diabetes.
In some
situations, however, manipulating single genes is not sufficient, and
in those cases the emerging technology of synthetic biology is
allowing scientists to move beyond the limitations imposed by
27
recombinant DNA techniques.

20

ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 11, at 491 (rDNA technology has been used in the
classification of genes/proteins and studying regulatory networks of genes); M.J.
The, Human Insulin: DNA Technology’s First Drug, 46 AM. J. OF HOSP. PHARMACY 11
(Nov. 1989) (mass production of human insulin as a replacement for insulin derived
from
animal
sources);
Roundup
Ready
System,
MONSANTO.COM,
http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement/Pages/roundup-ready-system.aspx
(last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (genetically modified plants developed using rDNA
technology increase crop yields).
21
See, e.g., Suzanne Cheng, Carita Fockler, Wayne M. Barnes & Russel Higuchi,
Effective Amplification of Long Targets From Cloned Inserts and Human Genomic DNA, 91
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES 5695 (1994). It is possible to PCR
amplify sequences of DNA up to approximately forty-thousand bases. Id. at 5698.
For comparison, the human genome is billions of bases long.
22
See, e.g., Bruce A. Roe et al., Protocols for Recombinant DNA Isolation, Cloning, and
Sequencing, http://www.genome.ou.edu/protocol_book/protocol_index.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012) (explaining that even the simplest cloning procedure involves
many steps and will take several days to complete).
23
Subin Mary Zachariah & Leena K. Pappachen, A Study of Genetic Engineering
Techniques In Biotechnology Based Pharmaceuticals, 3 INTERNET J. NANOTECHNOLOGY 1
(2009), available at http://www.ispub.com/journal
/the-internet-journal-of-nanotechnology/volume-3-number-1/a-study-of-geneticengineering-techniques-in-biotechnology-based-pharmaceuticals.html.
24
The, supra note 20.
25
Id.; INSULIN RECOMBINANT, DRUGBANK.CA, http://www.drugbank.ca/drugs
/DB00030 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
26
The, supra note 20.
27
See generally, Heinemann & Panke, supra note 2.
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B. Defining the New Technology of Synthetic Biology
There is no bright line that distinguishes the older rDNA
28
technology from the new synthetic biology. Scientists began using
the latter term in light of advanced techniques for chemically
synthesizing sequences of DNA, along with a growing understanding
of how multiple genes work in groups to form “gene networks” or
29
“gene circuits.”
Thus, it is not surprising that the term means
something different depending on one’s technical background.
Drew Endy, one of the pioneers of synthetic biology, stated that for
the biologist, the term means “the ability to design and construct
synthetic biological systems [to] provide[] a direct and compelling
30
method for testing our current understanding . . . .”
For the
chemist, “synthetic biology is an extension of synthetic chemistry[:]
the ability to create novel molecules and molecular systems [to allow]
the development of useful diagnostic assays and drugs, expansion of
genetically encoded functions, [and] study of the origins of
31
life . . . .” For the group of people Endy refers to as “re-writers,” the
term means that “the genomes encoding natural biological systems
can be ‘re-written,’ producing engineered surrogates that might
32
usefully supplant some natural biological systems.” And finally, for
engineers, synthetic biology is an attempt “to combine a broad
expansion of biotechnology applications with . . . an emphasis on the
development of foundational technologies that make the design and
33
construction of engineered biological systems easier.”
For the purposes of this Comment, the technology of synthetic
biology is summarized as follows: advances in the ability to chemically
synthesize sequences of DNA, plus a growing understanding of how
genes function singularly and in groups, allowing scientists to treat
genes as biological parts that they can use to engineer a living
organism—much like an engineer would use various parts to build a
machine.
This Comment adopts this definition because the
technological capability of designing standardized biological parts is
34
necessary for the establishment of open-source synthetic biology.
28

See Drew Endy, Foundations for Engineering Biology, 438 NATURE 449, 449 (2005).
Jeff Hasty, David McMillen & J.J. Collins, Engineered Gene Circuits, 420 NATURE
224, 224 (2002).
30
Endy, supra note 28, at 449.
31
Id.
32
Id. (internal citation omitted).
33
Id.
34
See David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 168 (2004). Professor Opderbeck reviews
29
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The definition is largely drawn from Endy’s engineering perspective
of synthetic biology in order to stress the importance of composable
biological parts that individuals can design and then contribute to a
synthetic biology commons. Also, this definition emphasizes that the
difficulty or ease with which scientists can create biological parts will
be an important factor in the success or failure of a synthetic biology
35
commons.
C. Faster, Easier Genetic Engineering via Synthetic Biology
One of the underlying goals of synthetic biology is to make
36
genetic engineering faster and easier.
This goal can only be
reached if standardized tools and methods are established that make
37
genes and gene networks function predictably and reliably.
Unfortunately, current rDNA techniques largely lack any kind of
standardization, which severely reduces the pace of technological
38
innovation.
Building a car from scratch is analogous.
An
experienced engineer with established tools and parts can build a car
from scratch with little difficulty because the function of each part is
known and standards are in place for parts to work together. In
other words, the parts of a car are known to be interoperable because
there have been “standards” adopted by the community of engineers
39
that build them. Now, imagine the challenge of building a car from
the aspects of a technology that make it amenable to an “open source” project. It
must be possible to break the project into components and each component must be
manageably small. With this in mind, I emphasize the development of discrete
biological parts in my definition of synthetic biology.
35
See id. Professor Opderbeck points out that rDNA technology poses some
technical problems with respect to component “layers” in the context of open source
biotechnology. Id. at 181–82. For example, manipulating DNA requires specialized
equipment and expertise.
Advances in synthetic biology, however, might
significantly lower this open source barrier. Specifically, advances in DNA synthesis
methods have the potential to make manipulating DNA sequences easy, fast, cheap,
and without formal training. Standardization of biological parts may also fulfill the
need for a common biotechnology platform. Professor Opderbeck also notes that to
establish open source biotechnology, there must exist social-psychological rewards
and a community of contributors with authoritative voices. Id. at 186–97. While
these two factors are outside the scope of this Comment, the BioBricks Foundation
could arguably be in the initial stages of fulfilling these needs.
36
Reshma P. Shetty, Drew Endy, & Thomas F. Knight, Engineering BioBrick Vectors
from BioBrick Parts, 2 J. BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 1, 1 (2008), available at
http://www.jbioleng.org/content/2/1/5.
37
See Endy, supra note 28.
38
See Endy, supra note 28, at 450.
39
See Smita B. Brunnermeier & Sheila A. Martin, Interoperability Cost Analysis of
the U.S. Automotive Supply Chain, RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE (Mar. 1999), available
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scratch not knowing how each part works or whether individual parts
can work together. Without standard parts and tools, the builder
would work by trial and error, resulting in a significantly longer
completion time. This problem is compounded when working with a
living organism—biological systems are far more complex than a car,
and every biological part has the opportunity to interact with every
40
other biological part.
Presently, all engineering of novel gene
networks requires a significant amount of trial and error during
41
development. For this reason, without standardized biological parts,
the pace of innovation would be extremely slow.
To make this point, Endy uses the example of creating a
42
biological oscillator.
An electrical engineer could create several
43
working ring oscillators in under an hour. In the biological context,
however, it took two of the world’s best biophysicists a year to make
44
an analogous biological oscillator. The main difference between the
two is that electrical engineers have standard parts available to them
45
that work predictably and reliably, while molecular biologists do not.
If synthetic biological techniques are used to make molecular biology
more like an engineering discipline, it will rapidly increase the rate at
which scientists create biotechnology-related products and therapies.
One field that would benefit from an increase in the pace of
progress is medicine. Recently, scientists have taken a synthetic
biology approach to engineer biological systems as novel therapies in
46
a pre-clinical setting.
For example, scientists engineered a
bacteriophage (a virus that infects bacterium) that can destroy
47
bacterial biofilms resistant to antibiotics.
Another example is
48
A
bacteria engineered to invade cancer cells in a solid tumor.
synthetic organism is even being developed to modify the “human
microbiome,” the endogenous ecosystem of bacteria found in all

at http://www.rti.org/pubs/US_Automotive.pdf.
40
See generally Wendell A. Lim, Connie M. Lee, & Chao Tang, Design Principles of
Regulatory Networks: Searching for the Molecular Algorithms of the Cell, 49 MOLECULAR CELL
202 (2013).
41
See generally Endy, supra note 28.
42
Endy, supra note 28 at 449; see generally Warren C. Ruder, Ting Lu, & James J.
Collins, Synthetic Biology Moving into the Clinic, 333 SCIENCE 1248, 1249 (2011).
43
Endy, supra note 28, at 449.
44
Id.
45
See id., at 450.
46
See Ruder, Lu & Collins, supra note 42, at 1251.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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healthy people, which is required for normal physiology. Scientists
are engineering the microbiome bacterium to live in the human gut
50
with the ability to prevent the secretion of toxins from cholera.
Scientists have engineered other bacteria to secrete various factors to
51
treat diabetes or HIV. Scientists may even be able to engineer a
laboratory mosquito that is resistant to hosting malaria and that
would be able to pass the resistance trait into the natural population
52
of mosquitoes.
All of these advances were the result of manipulating genomes
by removing and/or adding various parts to alter biological
53
pathways. These first few attempts at controlling the behavior of an
organism with synthetic biology techniques—by manipulating a
54
relatively modest number of genes—is useful for animal studies. But
in order to be possible in human beings, “it will be necessary to
identify entirely new modules and components from endogenous
networks as well as to synthesize and characterize diverse component
55
libraries.” In order to support human application, scientists will
require a substantial increase in the degree of control over the
56
behavior of synthetic organisms. The scientific community has a
strong motivation to advance the technology of synthetic biology as
fast as possible given the immense promise in the field of medicine.
The quicker scientists make advances, the sooner they can develop
novel therapies to treat human disease.
III. ADVANCING GENETIC ENGINEERING THROUGH OPEN-SOURCE
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
The benefits of synthetic biology’s engineering principles are
clear: faster, easier, and more novel solutions to the world’s
biologically addressable problems. But the question remains: once
standard biological parts are created, how should they be used in
order to foster innovation? Currently, gene patents dominate the
57
biotechnology landscape. Tens of thousands of human genes are
patented by various companies who solely own the patent rights to
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Ruder, Lu, & Collins, supra note 42, at 1294.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1251.
See id.
See Sam Kean, The Human Genome (Patent) Project, 331 SCIENCE 530, 530 (2011).
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58

use them. Many commentators have posited that these patent rights
59
slow the pace of progress in biomedical sciences dramatically.
Emerging technologies are, by their very nature, especially vulnerable
60
to broad patents that suppress innovation. Some commentators fear
that “foundational patents” (also known as “upstream patents”),
which are patents that cover an essential aspect of a technology and
are usually very broad in scope, will stifle the development of
61
synthetic biology along with all of its potential benefits.
This is
because the technology that a foundational patent covers is
necessarily incorporated into any downstream research or resulting
62
product.
One response addressing the potential threat of patents
inhibiting synthetic biology innovation is to establish a synthetic
biology commons where standard biological parts are made freely
63
available to all.
Once foundational biological parts are made
publicly available in such a commons, individual entities would not
64
have the right to patent them. Furthermore, some commentators
have argued that this strategy has the added benefit of encouraging
65
innovation. This “open-source” approach to synthetic biology is
analogous to the open-source software movement which was wildly
successful as it resulted in the creation of countless computer
66
applications including the Linux operating system.
The following subsections examine what it means to be “opensource” and how those open-source principles are currently applied
to the emerging technology of synthetic biology. One organization
in particular, the BioBricks Foundation, has been established to

58

Id. at 531.
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–99 (1998) (arguing that
patents over various biomedical technologies may result in an “anticommons” where
intellectual property rights result in underutilization of technology that hinders
advancement).
60
Id. at 698.
61
See id.; Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1757 (2007).
62
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 698.
63
Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, The Economics of Synthetic Biology, 3
MOLECULAR SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 1, 3–4 (2007), available at http://www.nature.com
/msb/journal/v3/n1/full/msb4100161.html.
64
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
65
See Torrance, supra note 10, at 650–51.
66
Id. at 654.
59
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67

launch an open-source community. Subsection III.A will describe
both what it means to be “open-source” and the terms used to
maintain openness in the context of computer software. Subsection
III.B will discuss the open-source strategy of the BioBricks
Foundation. Subsection III.C will consider the problems associated
with maintaining openness.
A. Open-Source
The term “open-source” has become strongly associated with
computer software code that is made freely available for individual
68
use and modification. The principles that open-source computer
programmers established, however, are applicable to other
technologies, including synthetic biology.
The Open-Source
Initiative (OSI), which uses the term in the software context, defines
“open-source” as terms of distribution that comply with specific
69
The OSI uses ten different terms of distribution, all of
criteria.
70
which are written with software development in mind. But each
term can be applied to other technologies where non-rivalrous
71
information is being freely distributed, including the technology of
synthetic biology. The most important OSI requirements to ensure
openness are: allowing free redistribution, allowing derived works,
72
and allowing a distribution of licenses. The free redistribution term
requires that a “license shall not restrict any party from selling or
giving away the software as a component of an aggregate software
distribution containing programs from several different sources. The
73
license shall not require a royalty or other fee for such sale.” The
derived-works term states that “[t]he license must allow modifications
and derived works, and must allow them to be distributed under the
74
same terms as the license of the original software.”
Lastly, the
distribution of license term states that “[t]he rights attached to the
program must apply to all to whom the program is redistributed
67

About the BioBricks Foundation, supra note 7.
Open Source Definition, OPENSOURCE, http://www.opensource.org/osd.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See Opderbeck, supra note 34, at 207–08. (“[I]nformation commons theorists
hold that information is non-rivalrous because an infinite number of people can
simultaneously think the same idea without diminishing the idea’s content.”).
72
Open Source Definition, supra note 68.
73
Id.
74
Id.
68
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without the need for execution of an additional license by those
75
parties.” Importantly, software developers writing computer code
have the intellectual property rights—in copyright law—that are
required to impose these terms on others who would use their
76
works. The BioBricks Foundation is a pioneering institution that is
actively seeking to establish an open-source biotechnology
community by applying open-source principles to the emerging field
77
of synthetic biology.
B. BioBricks Foundation
The BioBricks Foundation is an organization established to
advance the field of synthetic biology by ensuring that the
fundamental building blocks of synthetic biology are “freely available
78
for ethical, open innovation.”
Toward that end, the BioBricks
Foundation has established a synthetic biology commons where
various DNA “parts” are made freely available for public use, applying
79
open-source software principles.
With the goal of openness in mind, the foundation has created
User/Contributor contracts—collectively titled “BioBricks Public
80
Agreement”—to promote the use and innovation of BioBricks parts.
The terms of the BioBricks Public Agreement are meant to
ameliorate the threat of patent rights over BioBricks parts in an
81
attempt to promote their open and free use. The main goal of this
open strategy is to “make biology easier to engineer so as to benefit
all people and the planet. Today, it is difficult to share and reuse
genetically encoded functions due to high transaction costs
82
associated with patent-based licensing (i.e., time and money).” The
contracts contain some terms that are analogous to OSI terms of
83
distribution. The BioBricks Public Agreement is described as “a
75

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (Literary works include words, numbers, or other
indicia, regardless of the nature of its embodiment).
77
See BIOBRICKS, http://biobricks.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“We believe
fundamental scientific knowledge belongs to all of us and must be freely available for
ethical, open innovation.”).
78
Id.
79
About the BioBricks Foundation, supra note 7.
80
The BioBrick Public Agreement, BIOBRICKS, https://biobricks.org/bpa/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2013).
81
Id.
82
Frequently Asked Questions, BIOBRICKS, https://biobricks.org/bpa/faq/ (last
visited, Apr. 2, 2013).
83
Compare
The
BioBrick
Contributor
Agreement,
BIOBRICKS,
76
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scalable contract among parties”—a contract “between one person
who wants to make a genetically encoded function free to use and
84
someone who wants to use it freely.” There are two distinct types of
85
contract—one for the “Contributor” and one for the “User.” The
Contributor is the person making the biological part available, while
the User is the person utilizing the part that the contributor
86
provided.
The Contributor contract states that a BioBricks
Contributor makes “an irrevocable promise not to assert any existing
or future intellectual property rights over the something against the
87
other party to the contract.” Furthermore, the Contributor of a
BioBricks part must disclose the existence of any intellectual property
88
rights to the part held either by the Contributor or by a third party.
The User contract states that a User promises to “provide attribution
to the Contributor, where requested, and to respect biological safety
89
practices and applicable laws.”
Some commentators have noted that the BioBricks Public
Agreement sets forth more than the mere terms of a license intended
90
to prevent disputes over ownership rights. Rather, the terms of the
BioBricks Public Agreement are “an initial effort to draft a legal
constitution to guide the beneficial development of the field of
91
synthetic biology.”
C. Challenges Maintaining the BioBricks Commons
There are several significant challenges to the openness of the
BioBricks commons. Importantly, the BioBricks Public Agreement
does not include some provisions included in the OSI terms of
92
distribution. Three of these challenges will be discussed specifically
in this section. The first challenge is derivation: getting contributors
to donate derived work back to the BioBricks Foundation and not

http://biobricks.org/wp-content/themes/bbf/bpa-sample.php (last visited Feb. 12,
2012), with Open Source Definition, supra note 68.
84
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 82.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
The BioBricks Contributor Agreement, supra note 83 (section 4, Intellectual
Property Rights).
89
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 82; see The BioBricks User Agreement,
BIOBRICKS, http://biobricks.org/bpa/users/agreement/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
90
Torrance, supra note 10, at 663.
91
Id.
92
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 82.

FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/22/2013 2:26 PM

COMMENT

1375

93

assert any intellectual property rights.
The second challenge is
motivation: incentivizing individuals or entities that currently hold
patent rights of biological parts to donate them to the BioBricks
94
Foundation in the first place. The third challenge is the absence of
an end product: the open-source synthetic biology community will not
be able to realize the potential of novel medically relevant inventions
95
on its own. The first two challenges stem from the terms of the
BioBricks Public Agreement, while the third challenge is inherent in
96
biomedically relevant research. Each challenge will be considered
in turn.
1. Derivation
One of BioBricks Foundation’s open-source community goals is
to foster the creation of novel biological parts by derivation from the
97
parts currently found in the registry. Despite this goal, the absence
of terms in the BioBricks Public Agreement that require all derived
works to be donated back to the BioBricks Foundation creates a
challenge. Unless a User is the inventor of the biological part, she is
barred from asserting any intellectual property rights over any
individual biological part once contributed to the BioBricks
98
Foundation. But there is nothing stopping a user from asserting
intellectual property rights over a different biological part that is
99
derived from BioBricks parts. In other words, if a person has signed
the BioBricks User Agreement and, in using the BioBricks parts,
creates a new part with a novel function, there is nothing stopping
that person from patenting that novel part and asserting intellectual
property rights over it. In fact, the User Agreement specifically states
that there is no requirement to give any novel materials or
100
applications back to the foundation.
The BioBricks Foundation
makes perfectly clear that “[n]ovel materials and applications
produced using [contributed] parts may be considered for protection
101
via conventional property rights.”
As a result, the BioBricks User
93

See generally Torrance, supra note 10.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See About the BioBricks Foundation, supra note 7.
98
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
99
This statement assumes that the derived work is both novel and non-obvious.
See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006).
100
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 82.
101
Id.
94
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Agreement is fundamentally different from the traditional opensource agreement, which requires any derived works to be licensed
102
Without a reciprocal
back under the same terms as the original.
licensing mechanism in place to ensure that novel biological parts
will continue to be derived from the past work of users, maintaining a
cycle of innovation by participants in the synthetic biology commons
may be challenging.
2. Motivation
A second important problem is that there is no clear reason for a
person with intellectual property rights over a part to surrender those
rights and donate the part to the BioBricks Foundation. Arguably,
the only motivation to forego one’s intellectual property rights is to
103
make a philanthropic gesture.
Professor Andrew Torrance has
noted that “it is not obvious what incentives contributors would have
to contribute their BioBricks, especially if they must relinquish any
104
intellectual property rights they may have in order to do so.”
3. End Product
There is a third problem that is unique to synthetic biology as
applied to the field of medicine: there is no immediately usable end
105
Other open-source movements, such as the open-source
product.
software movement, were wildly successful in part due to the fact that
a working product resulted from the aggregate work of many
106
individuals.
The quintessential example of open-source success is
107
the Linux operating system.
It can be downloaded and used by
anyone in the world after thousands of individuals put forth effort
108
That is not always the case with
over many years to make it.

102

Compare The BioBricks Contributor Agreement, supra note 83, with Open Source
Definition, supra note 68.
103
Torrance, supra note 10, at 660.
104
Id.
105
See Bernard Munos, Can Open-source R&D Reinvigorate Drug Research?, 5 NATURE
REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 723, 724 (2006) (“There are, however, significant barriers
to the deployment of open-source approaches to drug R&D. One is economic. All it
takes to write open-source software is a laptop and an internet connection. With drug
research, someone must pay for laboratory expenses and clinical trials.”).
106
See, e.g., LINUX, https://www.linux.com/learn/new-user-guides/376-linux-iseverywhere-an-overview-of-the-linux-operating-system (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
107
See DOWNLOAD LINUX FREE, http://downloadlinuxfree.com/ (last visited Apr.
6, 2012).
108
Id.
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biotechnology.
If members of the BioBricks Foundation were to
engineer a microbe to be a medical therapy, the end product could
110
not be immediately used. Instead, introduction of the product
would require lengthy and extremely costly clinical trials as a drug,
111
biologic, or medical device. It is likely that an entire community of
BioBricks members would not have the knowledge or resources
available to undertake this task.
Thus, there are several problems to overcome in establishing a
viable open-source synthetic biology movement. The first is getting
people and corporations to make their derived works, which may be
112
very valuable, available for further public use free of charge.
The
second issue is getting people and corporations with intellectual
113
property rights to contribute parts.
The third, in the context of
designing a medical therapy, is getting a synthetic biology product
114
through clinical trials so that it will actually be beneficial.
The first two problems have been previously addressed by other
open-source movements, such as software development and human
gene haplotype sequencing, which also had to deal with the threat of
115
patents stifling progress.
In the context of those specific
technologies, several different strategies were devised to maintain
openness. Parts IV and V will address three strategies that have been
applied to other technologies that potentially can be applied to
116
maintaining open-source synthetic biology.
Each of the following
strategies previously has been evaluated in the context of a specific
technology and each has been successful in maintaining some degree
117
of openness.
Part IV will introduce these previously proposed
strategies. Part V will answer the question of whether any of the
proposed strategies are applicable to a synthetic biology commons,
and if so, whether any would be successful. This Comment will
evaluate three strategies: Copyright Open-Source approach, the
HapMap License approach, and the BiOS patent approach.

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

See Munos, supra note 105.
Id.
Id.
See generally, Torrance, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV & V.
See infra Part IV.
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IV. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED OPEN-SOURCE STRATEGIES
A. Copyright Open-Source Approach
Currently, copyright protection for sequences of DNA is not
118
available. If sequences of DNA could be protected under Copyright
Law, however, then it would be relatively straightforward to
implement open-source synthetic biology in an analogous fashion to
119
open-source software.
A license to use the DNA “work” would
include provisions that require the user to give back to the commons
120
121
any derivative works. The General Public License (GPL) that has
been commonly used in open-source software could be easily adapted
122
to cover DNA and would have the same open-source effect—novel
sequences of DNA or novel combinations of established sequences
that have been derived from previous work covered by the GPL would
remain available to the public.
Several commentators have suggested that it is feasible for
123
sequences of DNA to be covered by copyright law. Some observers
even suggested that this approach could be used to establish open124
source synthetic biology.
These scholars reasoned that DNA
sequences are very similar to computer software code because both
involve a set of software instructions that are first read and then
125
executed by hardware. Additionally, any unique issues that might
arise in the context of synthetic biology could be absorbed with a
126
relatively small incremental change to copyright law.
For example, Dr. Christopher Holman makes the case that

118

See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Ch. 11, II, C 458–59
(2d ed. 1992) (no cases or statutes have addressed the applicability of Copyright to
sequences of DNA).
119
See Torrance, supra note 10; Christopher M. Holman, Copyright For Engineered
DNA: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2011).
120
GNU
General
Public
License,
Version
3,
OPENSOURCE,
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (“Each
time you convey a covered work, the recipient automatically receives a license from
the original licensors, to run, modify and propagate that work, subject to this
License.”).
121
Id.
122
Holman, supra note 119 (arguing that there is a strong similarity between
computers executing software code and cells expressing genes, which suggests that
copyright could be easily applied to engineered DNA sequences).
123
See id.; Torrance, supra note 10.
124
Holman, supra note 119; Torrance, supra note 10.
125
Holman, supra note 119, at 712.
126
Holman, supra note 119; Torrance, supra note 10.
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engineered DNA should be protected by copyright law. He argues
that “[t]he major doctrinal leap occurred thirty years ago when
copyright protection was recognized for computer programs. In view
of the close analogy between software and engineered DNA, the
further extension to encompass engineered genetic sequences is a
128
relatively modest incremental expansion.” Dr. Holman argues that
engineered sequences of DNA and computer code both are
essentially sets of instructions that are read and executed by
129
hardware.
For computer code, the hardware is the group of
computer components itself; for DNA sequences, the hardware is the
group of proteins, carbohydrates, and fatty acids that make up a
130
living cell. Furthermore, advances in biotechnology have allowed a
131
high level of creativity in generating DNA sequences.
This is
important because the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
132
Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., established a minimum threshold for
a work to be covered by copyright law—the work must contain “a
133
modicum of creativity.” This is a relatively low threshold that could
be easily met even with the current state of synthetic biology because
the technology currently allows for the creation of DNA sequences
134
that are different—at least modestly—from what exists in nature.
Moreover, in recent years the Supreme Court has consistently
135
interpreted the Copyright Clause of the constitution broadly.
For
example, in the context of the Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court
does not interpret the term “writing” literally—photographs, art,
136
motion pictures, and sounds have all been considered “writings.”
And Congress and the Courts have expanded what constitutes a
“writing” for the purposes of the Copyright Clause to adapt to
137
evolving technology.
At one point in time, the only expressions
deemed protectable were those which a human could directly

127

See Holman, supra note 119.
Id. at 703.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
133
Id. at 346.
134
See generally Ruder, Lu & Collins, supra note 42.
135
See Holman, supra note 119.
136
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
222 U.S. 55 (1911); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903);
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
137
Holman, supra note 119, at 710.
128
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138

perceive, such as written words.
But in 1976 Congress explicitly
expanded the scope of copyright protection to include expressions
139
that could only be read by a machine. Through the 1980’s,
computer software was generally accepted as a type of expression that
could be protected by copyright, but there was some uncertainty over
140
the scope of protection. Dr. Holman sums up the uncertainty:
[D]id copyright protection extend to object code, which
could only be read by a computer, or was it limited to
human readable source code? What about operating system
software, whose only intended audience is a machine? Or a
computer program embodied in computer readable media,
such as a CD-ROM? Ultimately, all these questions are
141
answered in the affirmative.
Presently, there is a general consensus in the Courts that
copyright protection is available for any type of software, regardless of
142
its form or the medium in which it is stored. And considering the
expansion of copyright protection in response to changing
technology, there is good reason to believe that a molecule of DNA
could be considered merely another type of code analogous to
computer software and therefore could receive copyright protection.
Andrew Torrance makes a similar argument, but suggests that
instead of only thinking about DNA sequences as being analogous to
computer software, DNA might even be thought of as an actual form
143
of computer software. This is especially true in the field of synthetic
biology, where in the future a heightened degree of programmability
144
This is
will allow for a potentially limitless amount of creativity.
seemingly equivalent to the freedom of a computer programmer to
create any form of program, constrained only by the computer
language and hardware itself. Indeed, Torrance even notes that “one
of the primary goals of synthetic biology is to engineer cells and
genes to become ever more like computers and computer
145
software.”
If this approach is adopted, then DNA is already
138

See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2006).
140
Holman, supra note 119, at 710–11.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Torrance, supra note 10, at 647 (“Rather than portray DNA sequences as
analogous to computer software, a synthetic biologist might consider DNA sequences
actually to be a form of computer software.”).
144
See Endy, supra note 28.
145
Torrance, supra note 10, at 647.
139
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protected by the Copyright Act and no adaptation of law is needed in
order to protect sequences of DNA.
B. HapMap Licensing Approach
Some open-source movements have been relatively successful in
using a contract-based license to create an information commons in
146
the realm of biotechnology.
One in particular, the International
HapMap Project, was a joint public-private venture between several
universities and government agencies from around the world to map
147
genetic variation among the world’s human population. The stated
goal of the HapMap Project was to “help researchers find genes
148
associated with human disease and response to pharmaceuticals.”
The HapMap Project originally created a data access policy that was
meant to “avoid the filing of intellectual property claims that would
149
impede other users’ access to the data.” Due to the success of open
distribution, in 2004—approximately two years after the HapMap
project had started distributing haplotype data—the HapMap
Consortium decided that its data access policy was no longer
150
required. The HapMap Consortium reasoned that enough data on
human genetic variation was published such that any patent
applications derived from HapMap data would be considered obvious
151
and therefore not patentable.
Since then, all access to HapMap
haplotype data is freely accessible to anyone without having to sign a
152
license agreement.
The data-access policy that the HapMap Consortium formerly
used included a licensing agreement that a user had to sign before
153
gaining access to haplotype data.
This mandatory licensing
agreement stated that “you will have to agree to a single condition—
146

See About the International HapMap Project, INT’L HAPMAP PROJECT,
http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/abouthapmap.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
147
Id.
148
THE INTERNATIONAL HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last
visited Feb. 11, 2012).
149
Donna M. Gitter, Resolving the Open Source Paradox in Biotechnology: A Proposal for
a Revised Open Source Policy for Publicly Funded Genomic Databases, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
1475, 1483 (2007).
150
Id.
151
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Gitter, supra note 149, at 1485; NIH News Release,
GENOME.GOV, http://www.genome.gov/12514423 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
152
Data Access Policy for the International HapMap Project, THE INTERNATIONAL
HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-perl/registration (last visited
Feb. 11, 2012).
153
Id.
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that you will not restrict further use of the individual genotypes, i.e.
take any action that would in any way restrict the access of others to
154
The licensing agreement also
the data produced by the Project.”
prohibited distribution of data from the HapMap project to parties
155
that had not accepted the terms of the license.
This provision
addressed the possibility that a party who signed the license could
simply give the haplotype data to a third party who had not signed it
and was not bound by its terms.
C. The BiOS Patent Approach
Another past strategy to establish and maintain openness is a
patent-based approach, which the Biological Innovation for Open
156
Society (BiOS) utilized.
The Center for the Application of
Molecular Biology to International Agriculture created the BiOS
initiative in “response to inequities in food security, nutrition, health,
157
natural resource management and energy.”
BiOS currently holds
the intellectual property rights to several technologies relevant to
158
food production. For example, BiOS holds patents on several plant
technologies, including the plant-gene transfer methods, generation
of plant-gene fusions, and methods for genotyping genetically
159
engineered plants. Because BiOS holds the patent rights associated
with those technologies, it can make those technologies freely
available to anyone who wishes to use them if they agree to the terms
160
of the BiOS license. The mandatory license requires users to “grant
back any improvements in the core technology and to make such
improvements freely available to all others on the same terms that
161
BIOS [sic] provided for the original core technology.”

154

Id.
Id.
156
BiOS is an initiative of the Center for the Application of Molecular Biology to
International Agriculture (CAMBIA). See CAMBIA, http://www.cambia.org
/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited, Feb. 12, 2012).
157
BIOS, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
158
IP Portfolio Licensable from Cambia, CAMBIA, http://www.cambia.org/daisy
/cambialabs/ip_portfolio.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
159
Id.
160
Cambia is in the process of abandoning its licensing agreement and material
transfer agreement requirements in order to maximize the public use of its
technology. But the BiOS strategy for maintaining openness is still relevant to the
discussion because the strategy is still available for any person or entity holding
patent rights in a technology. See id.
161
Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it Patent Misuse?, 6
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 128 (2004).
155
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Some academics, such as Professor Robin Feldman, suggest that
162
this grant-back requirement may implicate patent misuse.
Patent
misuse occurs when the patent holder attempts to expand the
physical or temporal scope of a patent monopoly beyond what was
163
originally granted in the patent.
“To the extent that a patent
holder uses its rights to restrict the disposition of inventions not
covered by the grant, the patent holder may be engaging in behavior
that extends the scope of the patent grant and thereby may be subject
164
to a claim of misuse.”
While nothing necessarily precludes
someone from bringing a claim against BiOS, by Professor Feldman’s
reasoning it is highly unlikely that BiOS would actually find itself in
court under a theory of patent misuse because the BiOS grant-back
requirement is not inconsistent with patent policy and any anti165
competitive effects are outweighed by the pro-competitive benefits.
Professor Feldman comes to this conclusion by applying a two-part
166
test to the open-source grant-back requirement. The first part asks
whether the grant-back requirements of the patent holder are
167
The second part asks whether the
inconsistent with patent policy.
168
grant-back requirement fails the antitrust rule of reason.
In the
case of the BiOS initiative, the grant-back requirement is compatible
with patent policy because it is not intended to create exclusive use of
any technology; rather, it is intended to promote widespread use and
169
foster innovation.
And the grant-back requirement would not
violate anti-trust principles because it has the effect of maximizing
the amount of improved technology that is openly available, rather
170
than reduce competition in a technology market.
Thus, Professor
Feldman argues that open source biotechnology movements should
not be considered patent misuse because the grant-back requirement
does not fail either test.
V. APPLICATION OF PAST STRATEGIES TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
The previous open-source strategies described in Part IV lead to
the question of whether any of the copyright, license, or patent-based
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 142.
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 141–42.
Id.
Id.
Feldman, supra note 161, at 141–42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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approaches to maintaining openness would work in the context of
synthetic biology. This section applies these strategies to synthetic
biology and assesses whether any of them can be used to maintain an
open-source synthetic biology movement. Application of these
strategies to the technology of synthetic biology reveals that none of
these strategies are ideally suited to maintaining openness. The
copyright approach and patent-based approach are especially
unlikely to be useful because of recent federal circuit decisions and
prohibitive expense, respectively. While the license-based approach
can be applied to synthetic biology, it has several flaws that must be
overcome in order to sustain an open-source synthetic biology
movement.
A. Copyright Availability for Open-Source Synthetic Biology
The copyright approach to open-source synthetic biology is not
without problems because the applicability of copyright to sequences
of DNA is untested. While various scholars have made several
compelling arguments that DNA sequences should be covered by
171
Copyright Law, there is currently no indication that the U.S.
Copyright Office or Congress would approve the use of Copyright
172
Law to protect DNA sequences.
Also, scholars such as Andrew
Torrance, Sapna Kumar and Arti Rai have all pointed out that the
Copyright approach may not work for DNA sequences that already
173
exist in nature.
Indeed, copyright law is intended to prevent
verbatim copying of a writing, regardless of whether the writing is in
174
the form of computer software or DNA sequence.
And copyright
law does not extend to “discoveries” and thus, no naturally occurring
175
While
sequences of DNA could be protected under a Copyright.
designing novel DNA sequences that do not exist in nature may
become commonplace in the future through synthetic biology, the
current state of the technology largely involves previously existing

171

See Holman, supra note 119, at 703; Torrance, supra note 10, at 647.
See Holman, supra note 119, at 702.
173
See generally Torrance, supra note 10; Kumar & Rai, supra note 61 (stating that
the copyright clause of the constitution was intended to protect the creative works of
authors, it would not apply to naturally occurring sequences of DNA because those
sequences would not be creative works having an author).
174
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Copies are material objects . . . in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed.”).
175
17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright . . . extend to any . . .
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied.”) (emphasis added).
172
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176

genetic code.
For example, the vast majority of BioBricks parts
made available in the registry are sequences of DNA taken directly
177
from naturally occurring organisms.
While the applicability of copyright law to sequences of DNA is
178
untested, the Supreme Court’s recent views on intellectual property
rights of DNA suggest copyright protection may, in theory, be
179
possible. While no court has directly indicated that it would approve
or disapprove the use of Copyright to protect sequences of DNA,
there is some indirect indication that it might be receptive to
180
copyright protection for novel sequences of DNA.
The Association
for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office
181
(Myriad gene patent case) offers some insight into how the U.S.
courts view intellectual property rights surrounding sequences of
DNA. While patents and copyrights are distinct bodies of intellectual
property law, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the gene patent cases
may be an indication of future willingness to allow copyright
182
protection for DNA.
In July of 2011, the original Myriad gene patent decision,
authored by Judge Sweet in the Southern District of New York, held
that a composition of isolated genomic DNA was not patentable

176

See, e.g., Promoters/Catalog/Constitutive, PARTSREGISTRY, http://partsregistry.org
/Promoters/Catalog/Constitutive (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (In this example
category, all of the BioBricks's constitutively active promoter sequences have been
cloned from a naturally occurring organism; each sequence has a prokaryotic,
eukaryotic, or phage origin.).
177
Id.
178
See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Ch. 11, II, C 458–59
(2d ed. 1992) (no cases or statutes have addressed the applicability of Copyright to
sequences of DNA).
179
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2012), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
180
See id.
181
Id.
182
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part &
rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). There were two separate issues with respect to
patent eligibility of DNA sequences. One issue involved the patentability of cDNA
sequences, which do not exist in nature and are derived from mRNA. All three
judges in the Federal circuit agreed that this particular type of DNA is patent-eligible.
The other issue involved patentability of isolated genomic DNA. Isolated genomic
sequences of DNA do exist in nature; in the context of a whole chromosome. The
patentability of isolated genomic DNA was the subject of dispute among the threejudge panel in the Federal circuit and was ruled patent ineligible by the Supreme
Court. See Ass’n of Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303, aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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183

subject matter. Judge Sweet seized on the idea that DNA is a carrier
184
Any isolated
of information and that this property gives it utility.
DNA containing the same sequence information of native DNA is
185
therefore a product of nature and unpatentable.
On August 16, 2012, a three-Judge panel in the Federal Circuit
handed down three separate opinions, resulting in a reversal of Judge
186
Sweet’s decision.
Two out of the three judges on the Federal
Circuit panel completely rejected Judge Sweet’s reasoning, and
187
concluded that isolated genomic DNA was patent eligible.
Judge
Lourie held that “it is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as
isolated compositions of matter that determines their patent
188
eligibility” rather than the utility of informational content.
Furthermore, Judge Lourie stated that when determining patent
189
eligibility of DNA, the “informational content is irrelevant.” Judge
Moore concurred with Judge Lourie on the issue of patent eligibility
of isolated genomic DNA sequences, but wrote separately to
emphasize the utility of small isolated fragments of DNA and the tacit
approval by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and
190
congress. Judge Bryson’s opinion, however, followed Judge Sweet’s
original reasoning, concluding that “[t]he nucleotide sequences of
the claimed molecules are the same as the nucleotide sequences
191
found in naturally occurring human genes.”
Thus, Judge Bryson
emphasized the information carrying property of DNA rather than its
192
physical structure.
Most recently, on June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that isolated sequences of genomic DNA are not
193
patent eligible subject matter.
Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, stated that the patent claims at issue “focus on the genetic
194
information encoded in the [DNA].”
Justice Thomas pointed out

183

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. at 227–28.
Id. at 228–29.
185
Id. at 227–29.
186
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303 (2012).
187
See id. at 1303 (2012).
188
Id. at 1330.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1341–46.
191
Id. at 1355.
192
Id.
193
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
194
Id. at 2118.
184
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that this emphasis on information is necessary for patent protection
because otherwise, a would-be infringer could avoid offending any
patent claims by merely adding a single nucleotide base pair to the
195
patented gene, thereby creating a distinctive molecule.
Thus, in
order for a patent claim to offer any real protection from
infringement, the patent claim must be “concerned primarily with
the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the
196
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule.”
Importantly, the Supreme Court also affirmed the District Court’s
and Federal Circuit’s holding that cDNA sequences, which do not
197
exist in nature, are patent eligible.
Since the Supreme Court has agreed with Judge Sweet’s
reasoning and emphasized the information-carrying qualities of DNA,
a parallel argument could be made that copyright law should be able
to protect novel DNA sequences. When the informational aspect of a
molecule of DNA is emphasized, then one could reasonably argue
that the genetic information is simply read and executed by other
cellular machinery in a fashion analogous to a computer reading and
198
executing software instructions. Thus, if courts emphasize the
informational aspect of DNA, then some judicial reasoning would
exist in support of Holman’s and Torrance’s conclusion that
copyright should be applicable to sequences of DNA much like
199
copyright is applicable to computer software.
The Court’s willingness to apply copyright law to novel
sequences of DNA is far from certain. With the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Myriad gene patent case, patents are clearly available
200
to protect novel sequences of DNA.
As Kumar and Rai noted,
“Courts and Congress might be reluctant to layer on an entirely new
kind of property right, for fear that such rights would hurt rather
201
than help innovation.” Thus, despite the sound arguments for why
DNA should be protected under copyright law, it is possible that the
courts would be reticent to support its use in that context.

195

Id.
Id.
197
Id. at 2119.
198
See Holman, supra note 119 at 712; Torrance, supra note 10 at 647.
199
Id.
200
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
201
Kumar & Rai, supra note 61, at 1764.
196
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B. Application of HapMap Strategy to the BioBricks Public Agreement
The application of a HapMap license approach to maintaining
an open-source synthetic biology movement is possible, but it raises
issues associated with privity and enforcement. The HapMap
licensing terms, which were relatively successful in establishing the
open use of haplotype data, have some similarities to the current
202
BioBricks Public Agreement.
Both agreements contain terms that
prohibit placing restrictions on the information, or part, that has
203
been made available.
Importantly, this strategy does not require
any intellectual property right to bind the signing party to the terms
204
Kumar and Rai note that “[t]his contractual
of the license.
alternative does not require an underlying property right. Instead,
the contract simply imposes conditions as part of the price of
205
access.” Furthermore, the online nature of a license-based strategy
206
requires that the agreed upon web-based contract be enforceable.
Professor Donna Gitter has noted that “courts generally enforce
clickwrap agreements provided the licensee ‘receive[s] notice of the
license terms before buying or using’ [the software] . . . [and] ‘has
the ability to return [it] . . . if he does not agree with the
207
Professor Gitter suggests that the HapMap user
terms . . . .’”
208
agreement fulfilled these threshold requirements for enforceability.
The similar clickwrap nature of the BioBricks agreement suggests
that it would likely fulfill these threshold requirements as well. There
are, however, several issues that still must be overcome.
1. Third-Party Privity Problems
Third-parties not in privity of contract who gain access to
BioBricks parts will create several problems that must be overcome.
Privity of contract can be described as “that connection or
relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties. It
is essential to the maintenance of an action on any contract that
there should subsist a privity between the plaintiff and defendant in
209
respect of the matter sued on.”
Professor Gitter has noted that a
202

Compare The BioBricks Contributor Agreement, supra note 83, with Data Access Policy
for the International HapMap Project, supra note 152.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Kumar & Rai, supra note 61, at 1765.
206
Gitter, supra note 149, at 1487.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
RML Corp. v. Lincoln Wood Prods., Inc., 67 Va. Cir. 545, 549 (2005), quoting
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licensing agreement would not prevent third parties who have gained
access without having signed the agreement from violating the
210
Gitter points out that the HapMap license
agreement’s terms.
“does not bind third parties who obtain and use HapMap data
without downloading it from the HapMap website and who therefore
211
are not in privity of contract with the HapMap consortium.”
A
similar problem exists in the BioBricks Public Agreement: any third
party that obtains a BioBrick part without agreeing to the license
212
would not be bound by its terms. The HapMap Consortium sought
to overcome this problem by including terms in its licensing
agreement that specifically prohibited dissemination of HapMap data
213
to parties that have not signed an agreement.
Kumar and Rai
suggest that this indicates one of the difficulties when using contract
law to maintain openness: “the comparative weakness of the
contractual restraints paradoxically requires extremely broad
214
restrictions on dissemination.” A similar contradiction would exist
in the context of the synthetic biology commons: the openness of the
BioBricks parts could only be protected from third parties by severely
restricting dissemination of the BioBricks parts.
The BioBricks Foundation has not, however, implemented this
215
type of third-party restriction.
In contrast, the BioBricks
Foundation’s ethos of openness suggests that it would actually want to
encourage the free distribution of BioBricks parts to third parties in
hopes of a third-party eventually making a donation back to the
216
foundation.
Due to the absence of dissemination restrictions, any
third-party issues that existed at the outset of the HapMap project will
likely be amplified greatly in the context of the BioBricks
Foundation.
2. Enforcement Problems
In addition to the problems associated with third parties
violating the terms of a license, there may also be enforcement
problems with parties who have agreed to the license terms. For
the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1976).
210
Gitter, supra note 149, at 1487.
211
Id. at 1488–89.
212
The BioBricks Contributor Agreement, supra note 83, with Data Access Policy for the
International HapMap Project, supra note 152.
213
Data Access Policy for the International HapMap Project, supra note 152.
214
Kumar & Rai, supra note 61, at 1764.
215
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 82.
216
Id.
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example, a party may agree to a license that relinquishes any
intellectual property rights, but that party may later ignore the
217
There is no reason to
provision and file for a patent anyway.
218
believe that the patent would be void under this circumstance. As
Professor David Opderbeck noted, “[n]othing in the Patent Act
would suggest that a patent could be invalidated because some of the
underlying data was derived from a database in violation of the
database’s terms of use. Thus, it is unlikely that the [license]
219
provides any meaningful remedy once a patent has been filed.” In
terms of the BioBricks Public Agreement, although an individual
could fail to disclose the existence of a pending patent on a
biological part, the individual’s resulting patent would not thereby be
220
invalidated due to this violation.
Thus, users may disregard the
terms of the BioBricks Public Agreement, which are meant to
maintain openness, without any real recourse for the BioBricks
221
Foundation.
There are further issues that arise if the Foundation decided to
enforce the terms of the BioBricks Agreement in court. Gitter notes
that bringing suit against all parties who violate the user agreement
would “create a significant financial and administrative strain upon
the nonprofit research group, which must focus its efforts on
222
pursuing research as opposed to enforcing its data access policy.”
This certainly applies to the BioBricks Foundation, which is also a
223
non-profit organization and has limited financial resources.
Additionally, the area of biotechnology is very much an international
enterprise, and there may be no remedy against people who violate
224
the terms of the BioBricks Agreement in other countries. As Gitter
states, “[i]f the user happens to be located in a nation that does not
enforce clickwrap licenses, then that user might not face legal liability
225
for violating the . . . license.”

217

See Opderbeck, supra note 34, at 199.
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Gitter, supra note 149, at 1489.
223
About the BioBricks Foundation, supra note 7 (“The BioBricks Foundation (BBF)
is a 501(c)(3) public-benefit organization founded in 2006.”).
224
See Gitter, supra note 149, at 1489.
225
Id. at 1491.
218
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C. Application of BiOS Approach to BioBricks
There are several problems with attempting to maintain the
synthetic biology commons using a patent-based strategy. First, for
this strategy to work, BioBricks would have to hold either a few broad
foundational patents or a patent on each individual part in the
collection. Both of these options pose problems.
Unlike the BiOS Initiative, the BioBricks Foundation does not
226
currently hold the patent rights to any broad foundational patents.
While a few broad foundational patents might be successfully used to
maintain a commons, the difficulty with this approach would be to
“identify an area of inventive territory that was quite broad but
nonetheless not suggested either by prior broad patents or by
227
Considering the
information already in the public domain.”
existence of several issued broad foundational patents, it is not likely
that the BioBricks Foundation would be successful if it were to
proceed with this approach.
The alternative is to obtain a very narrow patent on each
BioBricks part currently in the registry. This strategy would not only
require the BioBricks Foundation to patent each part for which it is
the inventor, it would also require each individual “inventor” who
donates
his
or
her
228
part to the Foundation to obtain a patent as well.
This is not
practically possible. Obtaining a patent on a sequence of DNA, or
any other structure or method, could cost tens of thousands of
229
dollars each.
The BioBricks registry currently holds thousands of

226

Several members of the BioBricks Board of Directors hold patents as
individuals, but there is no indication that the Foundation itself is assigned any
patents. See, e.g., Board of Directors, BIOBRICKS, http://biobricks.org/aboutfoundation/board-of-directors/ (Tom Knight, one of the founding members of
BioBricks, holds over thirty patents).
227
Kumar & Rai, supra note 61, at 1765.
228
Other members of the BioBricks foundation could not claim to be the
inventor of biological parts donated by individual contributors. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
(2006); see also Dennis Crouch, With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in
35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived
Information,
PATENTLYO
(OCT.
04,
2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com
/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc101.html.
229
The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the U.S., IPWATCHDOG,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtaining-patent/id=14668/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (Even the simplest technologies costs approximately
$5,000–7,000 in attorney’s fees to obtain a patent, while more complicated
technologies can cost in excess of $15,000).
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230

BioBricks parts. Thus, the aggregate cost of maintaining a synthetic
biology commons by patenting each individual part would easily be in
the tens of millions of dollars. This is a prohibitively large amount,
even for a large for-profit corporation, and simply is not feasible for
the BioBricks Foundation.
VI. A STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATION (SSO) STRATEGY FOR
ESTABLISHING, MAINTAINING, AND USING THE END PRODUCTS OF THE
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY COMMONS
Part IV of this Comment introduced various past strategies that
have been used for maintaining openness in different technological
231
areas.
Part V then applied those strategies to the technology of
synthetic biology, concluding that a copyright or patent-based
232
approach is not possible and a license approach is less than ideal.
Each of the previous strategies discussed only address the problem of
securing derived works of synthetic biology for use in the open-source
community. The problems of motivating patent holders to donate
biological parts in the first place and getting biomedical end products
into the clinic are not addressed by the patent, copyright, or license
approaches described in Parts IV and V. The following subsections
lay out a novel strategy that may be able to tackle problems of
maintaining openness while, at the same time, incentivizing
donations and creating opportunities for realizing biomedical
breakthroughs. This strategy involves establishing a synthetic biology
Standard Setting Organization (SSO).
A. Standard Setting Organizations (SSO)
An SSO, also known as standard setting consortia, can consist of
“anything from a loose, unincorporated affiliation of companies, to
an incorporated entity with offices, marketing, technical and
233
administrative staff and a multi-million dollar budget.” The goal of
this type of organization is to set standards that are widely adopted
throughout an industry in order to enable innovation of a business230

There is no official count of the available BioBricks parts, but by simply
browsing the registry, it is clear that there are many thousands of parts. Registry of
Standard Biological Parts, PARTSREGISTRY, http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page (last
visited Apr. 6, 2012).
231
See supra Part IV.
232
See supra Part V.
233
Andrew Upgrove, Forming a Successful Consortium, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO
STANDARDS, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/whatisansso.php (last
visited Feb. 12, 2012).
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234

service or product. Standards are found everywhere in our daily life
and their importance cannot be overstated. The classic example is an
235
electrical plug and socket —people in the United States can go to
any store in the country and purchase any tool or device that requires
power and be confident that they will be able to go home and the
plug will fit in the wall socket. Both the plug on the device and the
electrical socket in the home are guaranteed to work together
because the manufacturers of the product and the socket have
adopted a standard. Furthermore, “[o]rdinary products like printer
cartridges and tires come in standardized sizes and specifications,
which fosters choice and competition in the supply of replacement
236
parts.”
Thus, standards have the beneficial effects of promoting
237
efficiency of innovation as well as competition in a marketplace.
Standards can be broadly classified into three groups: de facto
238
standards, private standards, and government standards.
De facto
standards arise naturally in a marketplace when users adopt a
239
Government
standard to the exclusion of any competition.
standards, in contrast, are promoted and enforced by a government
entity—for example, the U.S. government selected a uniform
240
standard for High Definition television in the 1990s.
Finally,
private standards are adopted voluntarily by members of an industry,
241
usually after the formation of a private SSO. With no requirement
to join a private SSO, “some flourish, while others enjoy only
242
middling success, and some fail to gain traction at all.”
At the core of an SSO is the establishment of policies to deal
243
with intellectual property rights, namely patents.
To accomplish

234

Id.
Multi-Standard Sockets, THE DIGITAL MUSEUM OF PLUGS AND SOCKETS,
http://fam-oud.nl/~plugsocket/MultiSockets.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
236
Edith Ramirez, The Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Intellectual Property
Rights
in
Standard
Setting,
FTC,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/110621ssowkshp.pdf
(2011) (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013).
237
Id.
238
Mark A. Lemly, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1899–1901 (2002).
239
Id.
240
James B. Koback, Jr., Standard Setting, IP and Antitrust, PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. 8816 (June 2006).
241
Lemly, supra note 238, at 1899–1901.
242
Upgrove, supra note 233.
243
Id.
235
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this, each SSO establishes a set of rules addressing the intellectual
244
Two particularly
property rights of members who have joined.
important issues covered in the SSO rules are “whether and when
patent claims must be disclosed” and the reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (“RAND”) terms by which a member will license
245
patent rights to other members. The RAND terms of a private SSO
could possibly be designed to address the problems of maintaining
open-source synthetic biology.
B. A Standard Setting Organization Could Address the Problems of
Maintaining Open-Source Synthetic Biology
The establishment of a private SSO might address the problem
of incentivizing the donation of patented biological parts by creating
a medium through which the part could be used by an open-source
community while at the same time protecting the intellectual
property rights of the donor. An SSO could also address issues
involved with using a license to get derivative biological parts donated
back to an open-source community. Finally, an SSO could foster
collaboration between an open-source synthetic biology community
and private entities in order to introduce synthetic biology products
into the clinic.
1. Motivating Donation of Biological Parts
An SSO could overcome the problem of motivation by
generating future value of a patented biological part, while at the
same time protecting the intellectual property rights of the donor. In
some situations donation of parts might be made freely because the
entities holding patent rights over certain technologies would gain
246
access to the innovative thinking of an open-source community.
For example, IBM has pledged several hundred patents to the open247
source community in order to foster innovation:
IBM is committed to promoting innovation for the benefit
of our customers and for the overall growth and
advancement of the information technology field. IBM
takes many actions to promote innovation. Today, we are
announcing a new innovation initiative. We are pledging
244

Id.
Id.
246
See, e.g., Statement of Non-assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Feb.
12, 2012).
247
Id.
245
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the free use of 500 of our U.S. patents, as well as all
counterparts of these patents issued in other countries, in
the development, distribution, and use of open source
software. We believe that the open source community has
been at the forefront of innovation and we are taking this
action to encourage additional innovation for open
248
platforms.
IBM likely is willing to donate patents because those patents are
more valuable if used by the masses of an open-source community
than languishing undeveloped by the company. Future value can be
generated from the use of patented technology by a community, and
companies like IBM can later capitalize on those technological
advances. There is no reason to think that this perceived future value
is limited to use with software.
It is entirely possible that
biotechnology companies and universities, which hold patents on
foundational technologies relevant to synthetic biology, would
similarly value work done by the open-source community of the
BioBricks Foundation.
But convincing patent holders to donate the presently valuable
intellectual property rights to an open-source community will be
more challenging. This is despite the fact that an open-source
community can also generate future value from technology patents
249
no matter the present value.
Patent holders may be hesitant to
donate their biological parts to the BioBricks Foundation via the
standard BioBricks Public Agreement because it would prevent
250
enforcement of any rights against users.
The terms of the Public
Agreement create a risk for an entity that has invested large sums of
money in obtaining a patent over valuable sequences of DNA because
a competitor could theoretically sign its own BioBricks Public
Agreement and then be able to infringe patent rights with impunity.
By donating a valuable biological part to the BioBricks Foundation, a
patent holder might inadvertently give up rights to a direct
competitor.
This problem could possibly be overcome by a direct agreement
between the BioBricks Foundation and a patent holder, in which it is
agreed to allow the use of patented technology by BioBricks
Foundation members, without actually signing the Contributor
248

Id.
See Micheal Fauscette, The Value of Open Source, IDC ANALYST CONNECTION,
available at http://www.redhat.com/f/pdf/IDC_749_CarveOutCosts.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2012).
250
See The BioBrick Public Agreement, supra note 80.
249
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Agreement. This potential solution, however, leaves open the
possibility that the patent holder could decide to assert intellectual
property rights at a later date, stopping all future innovation with the
part. It is unlikely that members of the BioBricks Foundation would
want to invest time developing a technology only to be forced to stop
at some future date.
The establishment of a private SSO would create a medium
through which the patented biological part could be given to
BioBricks members while at the same time protecting the intellectual
property rights of the donor. The private SSO would include a
unique provision to achieve this end. The SSO contract would
contain an ex ante RAND term that creates a sliding scale based on the
non-profit or for-profit nature of the entity using the patented
material. For the non-profit organization, the reasonable and
nondiscriminatory license fee would be zero.
For all other
organizations joining the private-SSO, the license terms would follow
the fair market value of the patent rights. Using RAND terms of this
nature will motivate patent holders of biological parts to donate them
to an open-source community because future value will be generated
on the part, and competitors would not have the opportunity to
exploit a donation.
2. An SSO Addresses Issues of Enforceability Involved with a
Licensing Agreement
251

As discussed in Section V above, one of the problems with
using a contract licensing approach to maintaining openness in the
BioBricks Foundation is that a party does not have any real recourse
252
if another party violates the terms.
For example, a donor of a
biological part could make a promise not to assert any patent rights
over a donated part, but then later demand that the part not be used.
To remedy this, donation of biological parts under the umbrella of
an SSO would make it perfectly clear that the agreement is not simply
an agreement among parties to use the patented material, but rather
the adoption of a standard part in which time and money will be
invested. This strong declaration that a standard is being adopted
will bring with it several aspects of protection that exist in common
law.
One legal theory that exists in common law is equitable estoppel.
Equitable estoppel is a legal principle that protects one party from
251
252

Supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
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another party’s intentional, voluntary conduct. The Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals has articulated a three-part test to determine
whether a party may use equitable estoppel to bar a patent
254
infringement claim.
First, the patent holder must lead the
infringer, by misleading conduct, to reasonably infer that no property
255
Types of misleading conduct include
rights will be asserted.
“specific statements, action, inaction, or silence where there was an
256
obligation to speak.” Second, the infringer must have relied on the
257
misleading conduct of the patent holder. Third, the infringer must
258
be materially prejudiced by allowing proceedings to continue.
There is also case law demonstrating that when a patent holder
induces another party to adopt a standard in the context of an SSO,
the patent holder cannot arbitrarily enforce his or her rights at a later
259
date.
An example of this application of estoppel can be found in
260
Stambler v. Diebold, Inc.
In that case, the plaintiff allowed the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to adopt, as an
industry standard, a technology relating to card validation of ATM
261
machines. It was well known throughout the industry that the ANSI
was considering adopting this standard, and it was also known that
plaintiff held a patent on similar technology. Furthermore, the
262
plaintiff sat on the ANSI committee, which adopted the standard.
Before official adoption, plaintiff had concluded that the proposed
standard infringed his patent, but did not disclose this belief to other
263
members of the committee.
It was not until ten years later, when
the standard was fully entrenched in ATM machine technology, that
264
Ultimately,
the plaintiff brought suit for patent infringement.
Judge Platt held that there was evidence of “misleading conduct on
the part of the plaintiff that may have led the defendant to conclude
that plaintiff did not intend to enforce his patent,” and further held

253
254

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 253 (3d ed. 1996).
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir.

1992).
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1028.
Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
Id.
Id. at 1713.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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265

that the conduct was intentional.
The court used the theory of
estoppel to deny the plaintiff the right to enforce the patent,
reasoning that the plaintiff had a duty to speak out rather than allow
266
the industry to adopt the standard. Judge Platt found it especially
telling that the plaintiff had waited “while an entire industry
implemented the proposed standard and then when the standards
were adopted assert[ed] that his patent covered what manufacturers
267
believed to be an open and available standard.”
In light of the Federal Circuit’s three-part test and the holding
of Stambler v. Diebold, the BioBricks Foundation could clearly be
afforded the protection of estoppel for a biological part donated
under a SSO. If a BioBricks part contributor tried to revoke the
license of a patent after donating a biological part, all the elements of
equitable estoppel would be fulfilled. First, the BioBricks Foundation
would have reasonably inferred that the contributor did not enforce
the patent because of the acceptance of the contributor’s donation.
Second, BioBricks would have relied on that agreement by depositing
the DNA part into the registry. Third, the BioBricks Foundation
would be materially prejudiced by later enforcement because the
Foundation would have built subsequent biological parts that are
uniquely composable with the original donated part; i.e. the donated
part is adopted as a standard. While all the elements of equitable
estoppel might be available absent the formal adoption of any
standards, the strong declaration that a SSO is adopting a standard
makes fulfillment of the second and third prongs abundantly clear.
An alternative legal theory for preventing the assertion of patent
268
rights over an adopted standard is that of an implied license. The
primary difference between an implied license and equitable
estoppel is that “that implied license looks for an affirmative grant of
269
consent or permission to make, use, or sell.” Under this theory, the
BioBricks Foundation would be protected from enforcement of
patents that are acquired after a biological standard part has been
270
adopted. An illustration of this type of protection can be found in
AMP Incorporated v. United States. In that case, AMP entered into a

265

Id. at 1714.
Id.
267
Id.
268
AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
269
Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics of America, Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1997)
270
See AMP Inc., 389 F.2d at 449.
266
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contract with the government to furnish “60 experimental models of
271
The contract granted the government “an
[a] wire splicing tool.”
irrevocable, non-exclusive, nontransferable and royalty-free” license
272
to use the tool. After AMP shipped the items, it discovered that its
273
patent on the tool had been infringing another company’s patent.
AMP purchased the rights to the other company’s patent and then
274
tried to revoke the original license it granted the government. The
court held that an implied license existed between AMP and the
government, even though the government would have been
275
infringing the third party’s patent.
The court reasoned that a
license cannot be negated if there is no change in the structure of the
276
invention.
The holding of AMP Incorporated can be applied to biological
parts adopted as a standard in an SSO setting. If an SSO member
were to donate a biological part and subsequently acquire a patent on
that part, an implied license would prevent the member from being
able to enforce the after-acquired patent rights against BioBricks or
any other members of the SSO. Furthermore, some courts have
expanded the scope of implied license to include actions that fall
277
short of express licenses.
Thus, in the context of an SSO, when a
biological part is formally adopted as a standard, it would indicate to
members of the SSO that there is an implied license to use the part,
278
based on the agreed upon terms.
3. Enforcing SSO Terms and Bringing Synthetic Biology to
the Clinic
A standard setting organization creates a scenario where
proprietary entities and open-source communities would have an
aligned interest in the standard that is adopted. The patent holder
benefits from an increased value of an adopted standard; the parties
using the patented technology would benefit from the enhanced
ability to innovate and collaborate through use of the standard. This
271

Id.
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
AMP Inc., 389 F.2d at 448.
276
Id.
277
See Wang Labs., Inc., 103 F.3d at 1582 .
278
See id. (The court looked to the entire course of conduct by the plaintiff,
including the fact that they encouraged adoption of their technology as a standard,
when concluding that an implied license defense was available).
272
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alignment of interest could significantly benefit the BioBricks
Foundation because the financial resources of a for-profit
corporation might be used to prevent any individual member of the
279
SSO from “gaming” the system. For example, an SSO member that
promotes the use of a patented technology, but later tries to enforce
patent rights on unreasonable terms, could be sued under one of the
280
legal theories described above.
Unfortunately, this would require
financial resources that the BioBicks Foundation does not have on its
own. If, however, the interests of the other SSO members were
aligned with that of the BioBricks Foundation, then a SSO member
with money to spend could incidentally protect the interest of the
BioBricks Foundation in trying to protect its own self-interest. Thus,
the otherwise impracticable legal recourse of equitable estoppel and
implied license becomes available to the BioBricks Foundation in the
context of an SSO.
Also, the aligned interests of the BioBricks Foundation with the
for-profit members of the SSO make it possible to address a problem
regarding the establishment of a synthetic biology commons that no
other previously proposed strategy could. Establishment of an SSO
may help in getting finished, medically relevant products of BioBricks
members out of the lab and into the clinic. For-profit biotechnology
281
companies have the resources and expertise available to undergo
282
Also, clinical trials last many
the arduous clinical trial process.
years, and the single entity of a corporation could stay focused on
seeing the process through, without having to rely on any individual
283
person to complete the process.
These are endeavors that a
synthetic biology commons could not achieve by its very nature, with
279

See Lemly, supra note 238 at 1899.
See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir.
1992); AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
281
Avik Roy, How the FDA Stifles New Cures, Part I: The Rising Cost of Clinical Trials,
FORBES (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/24/
how-the-fda-stifles-new-cures-part-i-the-rising-cost-of-clinical-trials/ (“[A] recent total
[of] R&D spending from the 12 leading pharmaceutical companies from 1997 to
2011. . . found that they had spent $802 billion to gain approval for just 139 drugs: a
staggering $5.8 billion per drug.”)
282
There are a host of regulations that govern the conduct of clinical trials
involving both human and non-human animal subjects. See FDA Regulations Relating
to
Good
Clinical
Practice
and
Clinical
Trials,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/
ucm155713.htm#FDARegulations (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
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The time it takes to complete a clinical trial ranges from years to decades. See
Clinical Trials.gov, http://clinicaltrials.gov/show/NCT00249873 (last visited Sept. 16,
2013).
280

FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/22/2013 2:26 PM

COMMENT

1401

many individuals investing little time and money and producing
something big with their aggregate work. Thus, with such an
alignment of interests, the novel biological parts made by BioBricks
members could be used freely by all for-profit members of the SSO.
These novel biological parts could then be used to derive therapies,
which can be patented, thereby incentivizing investment into clinical
trials. To keep the cycle of innovation going, the for-profit patented
technologies could be adopted as standards and used further by
BioBricks members under the same SSO terms.
VII. CONCLUSION
The emerging technology of synthetic biology promises to have
284
a huge impact on industry and medicine. With that in mind, efforts
should be made to promote the development of the technology in a
way that maximizes the speed of innovation. In the world of
285
biotechnology, where patents dominate, an open-source approach
to synthetic biology may be a good way to drive the technology
forward and avoid potential stifling effects of intellectual property
rights. This Comment has reviewed some of the problems associated
with an open-source approach to synthetic biology and the various
strategies used in the context of other technologies for maintaining
openness. This Comment argues that a patent or copyright approach
for maintaining openness is not possible and that a license approach
is less than ideal. Here, a novel SSO approach is proposed that not
only could maintain openness, but also motivate donation of
synthetic biological parts and help bring biomedical advances closer
to clinical trials. The stated goal of the BioBricks Foundation is to
“accelerate the pace of innovation, collapse development timelines
and speed time-to-market of inventive synthetic biology-based
286
solutions.”
Private SSOs have achieved these same ends with
287
various other technologies.
Thus, even though the BioBricks
Foundation strategy for advancing synthetic biology involves largely
open-source principles, the establishment of a formal private SSO
may better advance the Foundation’s goals. In a world where
intellectual property rights over foundational technologies threaten
284
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to stifle progress, creative thinking is necessary in order to advance
synthetic biology and unlock the vast potential it has to benefit the
world.

